This paper analyzes the fundamental limits of strategic communication in network settings. Strategic communication differs from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since it involves different objectives for the encoder and the decoder, which are aware of this mismatch and act accordingly. This leads to a Stackelberg game where both agents commit to their mappings ex-ante. Building on our prior work on the point-to-point setting, this paper studies the compression and communication problems with the receiver and/or the transmitter side information setting. The equilibrium strategies and the associated costs are characterized for the Gaussian variables and quadratic cost functions. Several questions on the benefit of side information in source and joint source-channel coding in such strategic settings are analyzed. Our analysis has uncovered an interesting result on optimality of uncoded communication in strategic source-channel coding in the presence of receiver side information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a Stackelberg game between a transmitter and a receiver which have conflicting objectives. Both agents commit to their mappings ex-ante, i.e., they decide the mappings based on the source/channel statistics. Such communication settings where the objectives of the transmitter and the receiver differ are referred to here as "strategic communication." Strategic communication settings have been studied extensively in the information economics literature, e.g., the Nash equilibrium variant of this problem corresponds to the classical "cheap talk" problem [1] ; while the Stackelberg equilibrium, which is the focus of this paper, was introduced more recently under the names of Bayesian Persuasion [2] , and optimal information disclosure [3] , and has received significant interest in information economics [4] - [7] . However, an information theoretic analysis of strategic communication has been undertaken only very recently [8] .
This work extends the strategic compression and joint source-channel coding problems in point-to-point settings (which were analyzed in our earlier work [8] ) to ones with receiver/transmitter side information (SI), as a first step to analyze more complex network settings. We consider the strategic equivalent of the well-known Wyner and Ziv [9] problem (with and without SI at the receiver), and also study the associated source-channel coding settings. The strategic aspect of the problem yields some interesting variations of the well-known results associated with the non-strategic settings. For example, This work was supported in part by AFOSR MURI Grant FA9550-10-1-0573.
the celebrated result of Wyner and Ziv on the absence of rate loss in the quadratic-Gaussian setting [9] (due to the nonavailability of SI at the transmitter side) also holds in strategic settings, i.e., the presence of the receiver SI at the transmitter cannot be helpful (to the transmitter or to the receiver) in the strategic Wyner-Ziv problem. Another surprising result, due to Goblick [10] , is that single-letter linear coding is optimal for joint source-channel coding of a Gaussian source over an additive Gaussian channel for quadratic costs (distortion and channel cost). It is well-understood that this optimality breaks down when there is receiver SI. We analyze the strategic equivalent of these settings and show that there exist problem parameters such that single-letter linear strategies continue to possess optimality even in the receiver SI settings.
We note in passing that the question of source compression with mismatched distortion measures has been addressed before, see e.g., [11] , and the references therein. The main difference between our line of "strategic communication" work and all earlier ones in information theory is that in our problem, the encoder and the decoder are aware of the mismatched objectives, and they act (design the encoding and the decoding mappings) accordingly. In prior work, this mismatch was considered to be created by Nature (worst case, or robust design) [11] , [12] or by an adversarial secondary decoder [13] , but not as an intentional consequence of strategic agents.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
R and R + denote the respective sets of real numbers and positive real numbers. Let E(·) denote the expectation operator. The Gaussian density with mean µ and variance σ 2 is denoted by N (µ, σ 2 ). All logarithms in the paper are natural logarithms and may in general be complex valued, and the integrals are, in general, Lebesgue integrals. L 2 denotes the set of Lebesgue measurable, square integrable functions {f : R → R}. We use standard information theoretic and game theoretic notations for the related quantities throughout this paper (cf. [14] , [15] ).
B. An Overview of Point-to-Point Results
Consider the general communication system whose block diagram is shown in Figure 1 . The source X and private information θ are mapped into U ∈ R which is fully determined by the conditional distribution p(·|x, θ). For the sake of brevity, and with a slight abuse of notation, we refer to this as a stochastic mapping U = g(X, θ) so that
holds almost everywhere in X and θ. Let the set of all such mappings be denoted by Γ (which has a one-to-one correspondence to the set of all the conditional distributions that construct the transmitter output U ).
We consider an additive noise channel as shown in Figure  1 , with Gaussian noise N ∼ N (0, σ 2 N ), hence the input to the receiver is Y = U + N . We first consider the simpler problem where there is no channel noise, i.e., we effectively assume σ 2 N = 0, and hence Y = U (almost everywhere). The receiver produces an estimate of the source,X, through a mapping h ∈ L 2 asX = h(Y ). The objective of the receiver is to minimize
while that of the transmitter is to minimize
over the mappings g(·, ·) ∈ Γ, h(·) ∈ L 2 . In game theoretic terms, we consider a Stackelberg game, where the transmitter (the leader) knows that the decoder (the follower) acts to minimize its own measure in (2) as a function of encoding mapping g(·, ·). From the transmitter's point of view, we are looking for an encoding mapping, g(·, ·), that minimizes a distortion measured by d E , with a decoder h(·) matched to the distortion measure d D .
Quadratic-Gaussian Setting: Most of our results concern the setting where the source and the private information are jointly Gaussian i.e., (X, θ) ∼ N (0, R Xθ ) where, without any loss of generality, R Xθ is parametrized as R Xθ = σ 2 X 1 ρ ρ r , with r > ρ 2 , and the distortion measures are given as follows:
Hence, we have the following cost functions:
The following theorem characterizes the essentially unique equilibrium 1 in the noiseless quadratic-Gaussian (Q-G) setting.
In the noiseless Q-G setting, the essentially unique equilibrium is achieved by g(X, θ) = X + αθ and h(Y ) = κY where α and κ are constants given as:
The strategic variant of Gaussian test channel, with or without receiver side information W .X
The (non-strategic) Gaussian test channel, with or without receiver side information W .
Strategic Compression:
A memoryless source X n and the private information sequence θ n are mapped to an index set
is denoted here as RD S which is characterized in the following theorem.
The following theorem characterizes RD S for the Q-G setting.
. For the quadratic-Gaussian setting, the equilibrium (D E , D D ) pair in terms of R is:
where A = 1 + 4(r + ρ). The forward test channel that achieves R-D function is
1 In this noiseless setting, the encoding/decoding mappings F (g(X, θ)) and F −1 (h(Y )) yield the same costs as g(X, θ) and h(Y ), where F (·) is any invertible function. This function corresponds to different permutations of labels if the message space is finite as assumed in most prior work in information economics [1] - [3] . To account for such trivially equivalent pairs of mappings, we use the term "essentially unique".
where S ∼ N (0, σ 2 S ) is independent of X and θ and α is given in Theorem 1. Remark 1. Theorem 3 admits an intuitive interpretation: in the Q-G setting, strategic compression simplifies to compressing X +αθ where α is the coefficient in the simple equilibrium. This enables, in practice, the use of standard, "of the shelf" encoding codes for strategic compression operating on the effective source X + αθ.
Noisy Equilibrium: We first review the non-strategic equivalent of the noisy equilibrium setting. Consider the general communication system whose block diagram is shown in Figure 2 , the source X ∼ N (0, σ 2 X ) is to be transmitted to the receiver via g ∈ Γ as U = g(X) over an additive Gaussian channel; hence the input to the receiver is Y = U + N , where N ∼ N (0, σ 2 N ) is statistically independent of X. The receiver produces its outputX through an h ∈ L 2 aŝ X = h(Y ). The common objective of both agents is to minimize E(X −X) 2 , while the transmitter has an average power constraint E{U 2 i } ≤ P T . The following result due to Goblick [10] , states Shannon sense 2 optimality of single-letter linear strategies.
Theorem 4 ([10]
). For the Gaussian test channel problem, single-letter mappings
are the essentially unique 3 , Shannon sense optimal encoding/decoding mappings.
This optimality breaks down in the presence of receiver side information, shown as W in Figure 2 , and linear strategies are no longer optimal even in the zero-delay case (see e.g., [16] ).
The following theorem states a similar optimality result in the strategic version of the problem (without SI).
Theorem 5 ([8] ). For the noisy Q-G equilibrium, the strategies
are Shannon sense optimal for all power levels.
In Section V, we incorporate SI into the problem setting. We show that, unlike its non-strategic counterpart which does not admit a linear optimal solution, there exist values for the problem parameters that render the solution to be linear. 2 Shannon sense optimality refers to optimality within the strategies that allow asymptotically high delay. If a single-letter strategy is Shannon sense optimal, it is also optimal among all single-letter strategies, but the converse does not hold. 3 If g(X) = cX and h(Y ) = dY pair is a solution to this problem, g(X) = −cX and h(Y ) = −dY is also a solution due to symmetry, which is why the solution is "essentially" unique.
III. NOISELESS EQUILIBRIUM
We begin with noiseless equilibrium with receiver SI. The focus of our results is the quadratic-Gaussian setting, i.e., (X, θ, W ) ∼ N (0, R XθW ) where, R XθW is parametrized as
and the distortion measures are given as in (4) . Hence, we have (5) as the cost functions.
The following lemma states that mappings at the equilibrium are linear (affine if variables have non-zero mean). Lemma 1. The noiseless Q-G equilibrium is achieved by mappings
for some α SI , b, c ∈ R.
The proof follows identical steps to those of Theorem 1. The coefficients, α SI , b, c at this equilibrium can be explicitly computed as in the case of Theorem 1, but this computation is rather involved and not included here. Instead, we focus on the high level impact of SI. We first analyze the benefit of the presence of receiver SI at the transmitter side. This question is intimately related to the feedback scenarios in strategic communication: if the receiver has the option of conveying its SI to the transmitter, should it choose to do so? Let us define D SI E and D SI D as the distortions of the transmitter and the receiver at the equilibrium with receiver SI; and D RSI E and D RSI D as the distortions of the transmitter and the receiver in the setting where SI is also available at the transmitter. The following theorem states that in the Q-G setting, the presence of the receiver SI at the transmitter is not useful to the transmitter or to the receiver. Theorem 6. In the Q-G setting, the following holds:
We begin by showing optimality of linear strategies in the setting where SI is available at both the transmitter and the receiver. First, we constrain the set of encoding strategies so that the encoding strategy takes (X X − E{X|W }, θ θ − E{θ|W }) as its arguments (as opposed to (X, θ, W ) ). Due to the jointly Gaussian statistics, (X , θ ) are statistically independent of W . The receiver has also access to W (hence W is common information), there is no loss of generality imposed by this constraint on the encoding strategy, i.e., the problem is equivalent to the one without any SI with distortion function of the transmitter E{(X + kθ −X) 2 } for some k ∈ R. The optimality of linear strategies, in X , θ then follows from Theorem 1. Since X , θ are linear functions of X, θ, W , due to the jointly Gaussian statistics, the encoding strategy is linear in X, θ, W as well.
Given that the encoding strategy is in the form of Y = X + aθ + bW , (for some a, b ∈ R), and W is also available at the receiver, Y = X + aθ and Y = X + aθ + bW yield identical costs since the receiver can simply subtract bW from Y . Hence, there is no need for the transmitter to use W in its encoding strategy, and we have identical costs for both settings.
Remark 2. We note the absence of constraint associated with Y in Theorem 6. A constraint on Y , such as an average power constraint in the form of E{Y 2 } ≤ P for some P ∈ R + renders the realization of W useful to the transmitter and also to the receiver as will be shown in Theorem 9.
IV. STRATEGIC WYNER-ZIV PROBLEM
We next consider the compression problem in this setting (see [9] for the analogous non-strategic problem). The achievable rate-distortion region (R, D E , D D ), denoted by RD SI S , can be characterized following the arguments in [9] and is presented in the following theorem. 
In general IT problems, side information has two types of benefits for the receiver, as demonstrated in Theorem 7 (for a detailed analysis, see [17, Section 11] ). The first one is estimation benefit, which corresponds to the receiver using W (in addition to Y ) to generateX, as shown in (13) and (14) . This benefit also exists in the single-letter case. The second one, namely the rate reduction benefit only exists in the IT setting, and is demonstrated by the term I(Y ; W ) in (12) . In non-strategic settings, the encoder makes Y correlated with W to maximize this rate reduction. However, in strategic settings, there exist problem parameters that render Y independent of W due to differences in d E and d D , and hence make I(Y ; W ) vanish. This observation plays a pivotal role in the noisy equilibrium with the SI setting. Next, we extend our analysis to the Q-G setting, as shown in Figure 1 , where X, θ, W is jointly Gaussian. The following theorem characterizes the forward test channel that achieves the RD SI S . Lemma 2. In the Q-G setting, RD SI S is achieved by
is statistically independent of X, θ and W . The equilibrium coefficient β(R) and σ 2 S depend on R. Proof. The fact that jointly Gaussian X, θ, Y triple achieves RD SI S follows from Lemma 1 and the entropy maximization property of jointly Gaussian distributions subject to second order constraints [18] . From the definition of the problem, we have the natural Markov chain Y −(X, θ)−W (see e.g., [19] ). Hence, we have
for some β ∈ R, and S ∼ N (0, σ 2 S ) is independent of X, θ and W . Plugging (15) into (12) , we have
and into (13) , we obtain
noting that h(Y, W ) = E{X|Y, W } due to quadratic d D and is linear due to jointly Gaussian X, Y, W . Using (16), we have
We next note that the objective of the encoder is to minimize D E over the possible choices of β, which is equivalent to maximizing
over β. Plugging (17) into (18) we observe that β * = argmax J(β) depends on R. Note that J is continuous in β and is bounded above, hence it admits a maximum by Weierstrass theorem [20] .
Remark 3. In Theorem 3, the compression coefficient β is independent of the allowed rate, and identical to the equilibrium coefficient α in Theorems 1 and 5. Here, due to SI, particularly, the I(Y ; W ) term, β depends on the allowed rate, and is obviously different from α SI in Lemma 1 where there is no rate constraint.
Next, we analyze the benefit of the presence of SI at the transmitter side. At first sight, it might seem that due to the strategic aspect of the problem at hand, the presence of this SI should help the transmitter. The following theorem states that this intuition is not correct; specifically, there is no benefit of the presence of the receiver SI at the transmitter side. Theorem 8. In the Q-G setting, the following holds:
Proof. We first note that, following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 6, the transmitter SI does not affect the distortions (D E and D D ). When SI is available at both ends, it can be shown using the arguments in [21] and Theorem 3 that the rate expression simplifies to R = min I(X, θ; Y |W ) where minimization is over all conditional probability distributions p(Y |X, θ, W ), while when SI is only available at the encoder we have the same minimization over p(Y |X, θ). Hence, the only difference is due to the additional Markov chain constraint Y − (X, θ) − W , it is well-known that for jointly Gaussian variables this constraint is always satisfied (see e.g., [9] ), hence does not affect the minimization.
V. NOISY EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we analyze Q-G noisy equilibrium with the receiver SI. First, we investigate the optimal single-letter strategy within the set of affine strategies. Lemma 3. Optimal linear strategies at the noisy Q-G setting with SI are
where α SI is presented in Lemma 1.
The proof of Lemma 3 follows from standard minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) computations, very similar to the derivation of D E in the proof of Lemma 2. Next, we present our main result pertaining to this setting. Theorem 9. In strategic, noisy Q-G setting with SI, singleletter linear strategies provided in Lemma 3 are Shannon sense optimal if and only if
where R is given as
Proof. Equating the outer bound obtained via data processing inequality R SI S (D) = C(P ) to the inner bound achieved by the linear mapping in Lemma 3, we get a matching condition which states that for the Shannon sense optimality, the communication channel in Figure 1 must be identical to the R-D test channel provided in Lemma 2 4 . Note that α SI does not depend on the channel parameters P T or σ 2 N . However, β(R) depends on the rate, and hence on the channel parameters, due to (20) . The only way to make the R-D test channel identical to the actual one is to operate at the rate which satisfies β(R) = α. By Theorem 7, β(R) = α implies that I(Y ; W ) = 0, which is equivalent to statistical independence of Y and W , which implies uncorrelated variables (due to the joint Gaussian statistics), hence we have (19) .
Remark 4. Theorem 9 does not preclude the possibility of optimality of the mappings in Lemma 3 within the set of singleletter strategies even if they do not satisfy (19) in which case they are strictly suboptimal in the Shannon sense (i.e., among n-letter strategies).
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of side information on strategic compression and source-channel coding problems. Particularly, we have shown that the equilibrium for the quadratic-Gaussian setting with receiver side information admits linear optimal strategies, if there is no channel noise present. Otherwise, i.e., for the noisy case, it does so for the 4 The same matching condition was obtained in [22] for the non-strategic variant of the same problem. very specific, matched case of the channel noise, the allowed power and the joint statistics of primitive variables. Some future directions for research on this general class of problems include a detailed study of vector and networked extensions, and applications of the developed strategic communication framework to other problem areas.
